-rw-r--r-- 11m Agent runtime How human-in-the-loop approvals get bypassed on agents
A team ships a human-in-the-loop approval step. The tests pass, the demo works, the security review signs off.
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ grep -l "architecture" -r ~/blog
5 posts on architecture.
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ grep -l "architecture" -r ~/blog
A team ships a human-in-the-loop approval step. The tests pass, the demo works, the security review signs off.
Between the get and the decrby, every other agent in the system reads the same stale balance and draws the same conclusion.
Almost every comparison of agent security tools lines up vendors on a feature grid and lets the reader decide.
The request that shows up repeatedly in agent framework issue trackers is a developer who wants to inspect and block a tool call before it executes.
Most production AI systems have an excellent model and a mess around it. I have seen GPT-4, Claude and Gemini sitting behind hardcoded prompts, zero validation and no separation of concerns.
~/blog: 5 matches
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ cd ~/blog && ls -la
The whole directory is one click away. Every post, filed by subject.
Four channels, all of them read. Pick the one that suits the question.
Where to start: a short question goes to Telegram, a brief goes to email.
No match.