-rw-r--r-- 10m Agent runtime An unknown outcome is its own state
A process crashes mid-execution. The audit log shows the action was authorized. The runtime logs show it was attempted.
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ grep -l "authorization" -r ~/blog
16 posts on authorization.
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ grep -l "authorization" -r ~/blog
A process crashes mid-execution. The audit log shows the action was authorized. The runtime logs show it was attempted.
Every step is in scope. The chain is a bulk data export to an external recipient. The agent executes them in order, because the task it was given was "produce a customer report".
The worker is on another pod. The queue keeps delivering jobs. Another worker picks up the in-flight execution.
There is a question most governance frameworks never ask, because it does not come up until an agent can write code, configure integrations or modify its own workflows.
An agent is authorized to issue refunds up to five hundred dollars. The permission is valid, and the agent uses it correctly.
Three agents, one platform. The support agent reads the CRM, opens tickets, and refunds up to fifty dollars.
A team wants an agent that issues refunds. Security is nervous. There are exactly two options on the table, and both are bad.
A tool is described by a JSON schema: its parameters, their types, what it accepts. This vocabulary fits an interface.
The sequence is short. An agent submits an action for approval. The operator approves it. The agent crashes.
Every framework ships a human-in-the-loop step. A human sees a card, the human clicks approve, the tool runs.
A team ships a human-in-the-loop approval step. The tests pass, the demo works, the security review signs off.
Fail-closed is a one-sentence rule: when the rule cannot be evaluated, refuse. Every enforcement system claims it.
The first version of this always looks the same. There is a number, the number grows, and when the number crosses a threshold the request is rejected.
Same agent. Same tool. Same permission. A support agent with refund access approves a twenty-dollar refund, which is exactly what it is there for.
The request that shows up repeatedly in agent framework issue trackers is a developer who wants to inspect and block a tool call before it executes.
An agent produces a perfectly acceptable response and then sends the wrong payment, deletes the wrong resource, modifies the wrong record, or calls a tool with a mutated argument.
~/blog: 16 matches
root@amaltsev >:~/blog$ cd ~/blog && ls -la
The whole directory is one click away. Every post, filed by subject.
Four channels, all of them read. Pick the one that suits the question.
Where to start: a short question goes to Telegram, a brief goes to email.
No match.